Protestant missions from the United States entered the Republic of Korea and Guatemala at the same time (1884 and 1882, respectively). Yet, their impact on human capital has been divergent. The analysis presented in this paper supports the findings of Woodberry (2004, 2009, 2011) and Nunn (2009) in the case of the Republic of Korea. Mainline Protestant missions — Presbyterian and Methodist — promoted the Social Gospel and were the largest in the Republic of Korea implementing successful strategies such as using Korean (Hangul) as the lingua franca in their schools, churches, and medical facilities. Whereas the mainline Protestant denominations in the Republic of Korea successfully promoted investment in human capital, the case of Guatemala does not follow this pattern. Evangelical, Pentecostal, and neo-Pentecostal denominations and churches focused their efforts on evangelizing. Their premilliennialist beliefs translated into an eschatological urgency of conversion with little investment in human capital. As a result, institution-building requisite for investment in human capital (establishing educational institutions and medical facilities) characterized Protestant missions in the Republic of Korea, but not Guatemala. These diverging approaches to exporting Christianity have had differing longterm effects on the two societies.

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In this study we examine how Evangelicalism reduces corruption by promoting individual traits such as honesty and trust and by fostering transparent interactions in church transactions and in society at large.  We seek to explain the contradiction that becoming an Evangelical requires a personal conversion experience that changes the believer’s life, yet the values that Evangelicalism teaches such as honesty, fidelity, self-discipline, and responsibility, are not often practiced in societal interactions.  The problem appears to be that many Evangelicals, in their social patterns of interaction, imitate rather than seek to alter dominant patterns of patronage. We focus on the diffusion of specific values—honesty, trust, self-discipline (work ethic, thrift, and temperance)—in society to identify how these values lead to the emergence of innovative  institutional mechanisms that substitute for established patterns of patronage and corruption. We seek to identify how a shared faith instills values that motivate equal treatment of others, including strangers. And, in what ways, based on those shared religiously-based values, Evangelicals are creating, or may potentially create, new organizational structures to alter societal patterns.

Historically, there is evidence that the Protestant ethos, grounded in Biblical teaching, is associated with higher levels of public transparency and trust.  Countries with a strong Protestant heritage, particularly in Northern Europe, show lower levels of corruption.  Evangelicals in Latin America display strong cultural dichotomies in their actions: religious versus secular, tithing to God (diezmo) versus public financial matters, caring for family versus giving aid to strangers. Kinship-based social structures rather than society-wide procedures of fairness continue to dominate public ethos. We seek to investigate how Evangelical churches are institutional agents diffusing certain values in society that account for the emergence of new societal organizational structures combating corruption.

Evangelicals are quickly becoming a majority religion in Latin America, yet corruption continues to be prevalent in official transactions and business practices. Transparency International (TI) reports that corruption in Latin America remains a serious institutional and cultural problem.  A substantial majority of Latin American countries rank below 4.0 (10 being the cleanest) in TI’s Corruption Perception Index. TI also reports that a majority of people in Latin America perceives that corruption has increased in the last three years. Some individual scores on this question are Brazil (64%) and Chile (53%); Guatemala was not included in TI’s survey. There is also a decline in the percentage of people who report that the anti-corruption efforts of their governments are effective.  Complicating the situation is the widening narco-trafficking activity throughout the region.  As many experts observe, there is a culture of corruption in Latin America.

Traditionally, most analyses of corruption have focused—we believe too much—on institutional and legal aspects, stressing detection and punishment rather than the inculcation of values (Jeremy Pope, “National Integrity Systems: The Key to Building Sustainable, Just and Honest Government,” and Jeffery Stout and Stuart C. Gilman, “Assessment Strategies and Practices for Integrity and Anti-corruption Measures: A Comparative Overview,” both chapters in Brian W. Head, A.J. Brown and Carmel Connors (eds.), Promoting Integrity, Evaluating and Improving Public Institutions [2008]).  As part of this agenda, the international financial institutions overemphasize political accountability and institutional reforms (World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group on Governance and Anti-Corruption [2007]; Inter-American Development Bank’s action plan to support the countries in their efforts to fight corruption and foster transparency [2009]; USAID Anti-Corruption Strategy [2005]).

We think that more weight should be placed on individual ethics and that concepts of public integrity (values of honesty, trust, transparency) are derived from personal and social values shaped by religious beliefs. Along these lines, in the last few years, scholars and policymakers have begun to pay more attention to the need for in-depth analyses of ethics in the anti-corruption agenda (Laura S. Underkuffler, “Defining Corruption: Implications for Action,” in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Corruption: Global Security and World Order [2009]; Stephen Schwenke, “Sectoral Synthesis,” in Bertram Spector (ed.), Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries [2005], Mary Noel Pepys, “Justice System,” in Bertram Spector (ed.), Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries [2005] and Eric Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law [2008]).

Latin American studies scholars have looked at the relationships among Evangelicals, democracy, and political participation, but not corruption.  Some scholars argue that Evangelicals are having positives effect on democratic participation and political practices (Paul Freston Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America [2001]; Timothy Steigenga, The Politics of the Spirit: The Political Implications of Pentecostalized Religion in Costa Rica and Guatemala [2001]; Timothy J. Steigenga and Edward Cleary (eds.), Conversion of a Continent [2007], Eric Patterson, “Religious Activity and Political Participation: The Brazilian and Chilean Cases,”  Latin American Politics and Society [2005]: 47, 1).  Contrary views are that Evangelicals, particularly Pentecostals, reinforce authoritarianism and traditional ways of doing business (Yvon Le Bot, “Churches, Sects, and Communities: Social Cohesion Recovered?” Bulletin of Latin American Research [1999]: 18, 2).

Little of the past research focuses on the relationship between corruption and religion, particularly Evangelicalism. A publication by the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Faith and Good Governance: Towards Strengthening Global Coalitions (2009) notes that global movements and discussions on integrity and governance have had limited participation of faith leaders.  A.J. Brown, “What is an Integrity System? From Temple Blueprint to the Pocket Guide,” (Brian W. Head, A.J. Brown, and Carmel Connors [2008]) argues that religious organizations, which are currently marginalized, could play a pivotal role in introducing integrity to politics.

Our study will investigate the relationship between Evangelicals and corruption in three Latin American countries: Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala.  Since the 1980s, Evangelicals have become actively involved in politics as party members, candidates for political office, and elected officials, including the office of president of the republic. The morality their religion preaches plays a large role in shaping behavior when confronted with the temptations associated with public service.

Our research begins with the Evangelical churches in Brazil, Chile and Guatemala. We will study how religious leaders and practitioners perceive corruption and the extent to which they think their churches are effective in reducing corruption.  The ecclesiastical structures of denominations and churches often perpetuate societal patterns of corruption by lacking formal mechanisms of accountability and transparency.  Furthermore, moral values taught by churches fail to be translated into action by congregants.  Our study aims to identify four relational aspects of religion to corruption: (1) Perceptions on the part of church leadership and congregants of the role of religion in shaping attitudes on corruption. (2) How certain religious values that have bearing on corruption (usually Biblical) are transmitted or not by church teaching and practice. (3) Which dimensions of a religion’s institutional structure permit or combat corrupt practices. (4) Which institutional mechanisms are churches implementing to combat corruption in society.

The plan of the research is to: (1) construct an historical analysis based on documents dating from the colonial period of morerias and mask makers in Guatemala. (2) Building on ethnographic research conducted on the dances over the course of the twentieth century, we will locate existing morerias, interview their owners and those who work in the morerias; (3) identify and interview mask makers who supply the unfinished, carved masks to the morerias; and (3) interview the autores of the dances. The autores or maestros of the dances are those individuals who initiate the performance of a dance by calling together individuals who will make up the dance troups. The autores know the dances and know of scripts or parlamentos of the drama-dances.

This research project is being carried out in cooperation with the Universidad Francisco Marroquin (UFM) and the Popol Vuh Museum, which is housed at that university. The UFM will serve as the institutional coordinating center for the project in Guatemala. The research team consists of five members, four of which are Guatemalan.

By studying the supply and demand of costumes and masks, we can ascertain several aspects of the dance industry in Guatemala. The supply-side of the dance industry in Guatemala, namely the morerias and the mask makers, provides an overview of dance activity over time. From the morerias we can learn the pricing and price discrimination of goods, the supply of materials (national and international) and the marginal cost of making of costumes and masks, the nature of the dance market (monopoly, oligopoly, open market). The nature of the market will determine quantities of goods produced, price discrimination, revenue, and profits.

By studying the demand for costumes and masks, we can ascertain the number of extant dance troupes at any given time within a geographic region, the socio-economic status of the dancers, the geographic locations of the communities in which the dances are performed, the frequency of the performances, and the diversity of dances performed. The geographic dispersion of the dancers will show us the individual markets throughout Guatemala on which each moreria depends for business. By locating dance troupes by geographic region, we can determine the market demand (all the individual markets) for costumes and masks. We will be able to see how the total quantity demanded of dance goods varies as the price of theses goods vary. Demand correlates with income. When income falls, the demand for quality dance goods fall and people may only be willing to rent cheaper costumes and masks (inferior good). This will influence the quality of materials out of which costumes and masks are made. For example, cheaper corduroy instead of velvet cloth for costumes and pine instead of mahogany for masks.

By studying the supply and demand of the dance industry, we can determine on which religious holidays dances are performed and how involved a community is in the religious festival (by the number of dance troupes and dances performed annually). Politically, we can find out if the local government supports the dances or discourages them. We can also find out how state-led promotion of national and international tourism (through the Guatemalan National Tourism Institute-INGUAT) has impacted the performance of dances. And, we can identify nonprofit cultural groups that promote and preserve the dance industry in Guatemala. Historically, several international and national political crises and trends influenced the dance industry in Guatemala: the Spanish Conquest, the Totonicapan revolt and the Constitution of 1824, the liberal regimes of the 1820 and 1830s, the Liberal Reform (1871) and its anti-Roman Catholicism, the World Wars, particularly World War II, the violence of the civil war in the highlands (particularly in the early 1980s), and the rise of pan-Maya cultural activism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

With Robert J. Barro, we seek to explain how religiosity responds to economic development and to government regulation, subsidy, and suppression (“Which Countries Have State Religions”). We want to know why some countries establish official state religions and how the associated subsidies and regulations influence religious activity. We look at state religion as a form of political-regulatory institution and seek to learn why this institution is present in some countries and at some points in time. We find that the probability of having a state religion in 2000 or 1970 depends strongly on the situation in 1900 but much more so, for countries that experienced no major change in political regime during the 20th century. Communist governments tend not to have state religion – only one Communist country (Somalia in 1970) had a state religion in the usual sense. However, a history of Communism does not significantly affect the current probability of state religion. Greater concentration of religious adherence is positively related to state religion, and most of this relation reflects causation from religious concentration to state religion, rather than the reverse. Theoretically, state religion is more probable when the population adheres to a monotheistic religion, but we find this relation primarily for Muslim adherence. State religion is less likely in sub-Saharan Africa, possibly because of the intense competition for converts in this region among the major world religion. Variables that have little effect on the probability of state religion include per capita GDP, country size, colonial and legal origins, and the extent of democracy, civil liberties, and the rule of law.

We also are studying how religious beliefs and practices influence productivity, economic growth, and the maintenance of political institutions such as democracy (“Religion and Economic Growth across Countries”). We use international survey data on religiosity for a broad panel of countries to investigate the effects of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth. We find that, for a given level of church attendance (also measured in the surveys), increases in core religious beliefs – notably in hell, heaven, and an after-life – tend to increase economic growth. Our interpretation, reminiscent of Max Weber’s famous thesis in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, is that religious beliefs raise productivity by fostering individual traits such as honesty, work ethic, and thift. In contrast, for given religious beliefs, increases in church attendance tend to reduce economic growth. We think that this negative effect reflects the time and resources used by the religion sector as well as adverse effects from organized religion on economic regulation – for example, restrictions on markets for credit and insurance. To put it another way, the main growth effect that we find is a positive response to an increase in believing relative to belonging (attending). Striking patterns of relatively high belief appear in the Scandinavian countries, Britain, and Japan. Although these countries are not generally viewed as religious, the belief levels are high when compared to the low levels of attendance at formal religious services. We also have some evidence that the stick represented by the fear of damnation is more potent for growth than the carrot from the prospect of salvation (“Salvation, Damnation, and Economic Incentives”).

We also examine how economic growth affects religiosity (“Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel”). When we look at the effects of economic development on religion, we find that overall development – represented by per capita GDP – tends to reduce religiosity.  Moreover, we argue from econometric analysis that this link reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse. Although religiosity declines overall with economic development, the nature of the interaction varies with the dimension of development. For example, increased education has very different effects from rises in life expectancy or urbanization.

This book (forthcoming Oxford University Press) looks at the growth of private voluntary agencies in international relief and development from 1939 to 2005. Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) – American Friends Service Committee, Oxfam, CARE, World Vision, and Catholic Relief Services, to name just a few – perform a vital function. They are the expression of American compassion overseas, a compassion that was formalized during World War II and has continued to grow since. This book explores the relationship between PVOs and the U.S. federal government. This nexus is a neglected yet vital connection between the American people and their government.

The contribution of this book is to understand how the PVOs we support and believe represent our humanitarian concerns interact with the federal government. A significant aspect of the interaction between PVOs and government is economic. By this I mean grants, contracts, subsidies (food, excess government property), and shipping the government provides to the agencies. To measure trends, I constructed a large dataset on revenue and expenditures from 1939 to 2005 for all U.S.-based PVOs engaged in international assistance and registered with the federal government. The data set is new and the most comprehensive on U.S.-based PVOs. Of particular interest is the interplay between public revenue (from the federal government and from international organizations and other government) and private revenue, that is, funds PVOs raise from the public. Do funds a PVO receives from the federal government, international organizations, and other governments serve as a magnet for subsequent private support? Or, once a PVO receives federal revenue, is it likely to continue to do so? And, in increasing amounts? If so, does accepting federal dollars compromise the mission of the PVO? A particular concern is the effect of United States foreign policy and funding on recipient organizations and their values.

Two recent trends in the field of international relief and developmet – increasing private funds to PVOs (decreasing federal dollars) and increasing awards to commercial enterprises – has significantly altered the nature of international relief and development. If the U.S. government, through its funding, is commercializing international humanitarian work, what is the effect on American values as embodied in the PVOs that since WWII have been the primary instruments of American foreign assistance? Are commercial enterprises more successful than PVOs? Should federal involvement in international relief and development be abolished all together?